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THE GROWTH OF A DICTUM
By FRANK N. RICHMAN*
We have Biblical authority, if it were needed, for the statement that the tongue is an unruly member. The carelessly
spoken word sometimes causes a lot of trouble. Not less hazardous is the inadvertent written word. Frequently its results are
far reaching, especially when it appears in the opinion of a court
of last resort.
In the case of Greer v. State,' the opinion contains the following statement:
"The appellant did not set out in his motion for a new trial,
nor has he set out in his brief, the answers given to the questions
of which he complains. These answers, or at least a statement of
their substance, and not merely the questions themselves, must
be presented, together with his grounds of objection, in order
for a determination to be made by this court of the existence of
harmful error, and the court will not search the record for the
evidence adduced by the questions complained of."
Up to this time, November 14, 1929, it is submitted, the Indiana appellate courts had consistently held that no question as to
the admission of evidence was presented for decision unless the
motion for new trial contained in substance the question to which
objection was made, and the answer, and that no question as to
the exclusion of evidence was presented unless the motion for
new trial showed in substance the question, and the contents
of the offer to prove. The courts had consistently held als6
that both the record and appellant's brief in its statement of
the record, (referring to the page and line of the transcript)
should show, in the one case, the question, the objection, the
*
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1 201 Ind. 386.
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offer to lrove, the ruling and the exception, and in the other, the
question, the objection, the ruling, the exception, and the answer.
But up to this time, it is further submitted, the appellate
courts of Indiana had never held that the "grounds of objection"
must be stated in the motion for new trial.
The language of the opinion is that the "grounds of objection"
must be "presented." Where? If in the brief, this would be in
accord with the rule and precedent. If it were meant that they
were to be presented in the motion for new trial, then the writer
of the opinion was indicating a change in practice that has been
prescribed by the Indiana text and form writers and generally,
if not universally followed since the adoption of the code. 2
Surely he would have been more explicit if he had intended any
such innovation.
The Supreme Court again, March 17, 1932, in Eva v. State, 8
states: "Appellant does not set out in his motion for a new
trial his reasons for objection to the questions or to the introduction in evidence the liquor found nor the answer of the witness
to such questions," citing and quoting as authority the paragraph
from Greer v. State, supra. In this case (Eva v. State) as in
the former, the point apparently raised by counsel for appellee
was that the motion for new trial did not contain the answers
to the questions to which objection was made, so that the ruling
was correct and the statement as to the grounds of objection
was obiter.
Cited also as authority is an intervening case in the Appellate
Court, Kenwood Tire Co. v. Speckman. 4 "Appellee contends
that this court cannot consider any of the reasons advanced for
a new trial relative to the admission of evidence because of the
fact that in said motion no one of said reasons states what
answer was given to the question asked." This point, of course,
was well taken, but the writer of the opinion, reviewing the
authorities to this effect, also quoted the paragraph from Greer
v. State, and probably made it the basis of a further ruling,5
not warranted, it is submitted by the cases cited, 6 that "the
ground of the motion to strike out not being stated in the motion
See II Watson's Works Practice Sec. 1925; IV Watson's Works Practice Forms 1544, specifications 22 and 23; 3 Work's Practice & Pleading,
Form 620; 1 Hogate's Pleading & Practice (1907), Sec. 699; 2 Elliott's
General Practice (1894), Sec. 991.
2

3 180 N. E. 183, 184.
4 (May 1, 1931) 92 Ind. App. 419, 421.
5p. 424.
6 Lafayette Agriculture Works v. Phillips, 47 Ind. 259; Vannatta v.
Duffy, 4 Ind. App. 168.
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for a new trial, there is no reversible error in the ruling of the
court in reference thereto."
Of the cases cited, Coryell v. Stone, Exr.,7 contains a similar

dictum in this language:
"The seventh cause assigned for a new trial is in the following
words: 'Because the court erred in allowing the defendants to
ask Jerry Dugan, a witness called by the defendants, whether
or not the testator gave to witness instructions to enable him
to make the survey.' This seems to us too uncertain to inform
the court of what the appellants really complained, and does
not refer to anything to make it more certain. It does not inform us what the question objected to was, nor what the objection to it was, nor what the answer to the question was, nor,
indeed, whether it elicited any answer or not, nor in what way
the survey mentioned was connected with the case."
This particular dictum, though quoted on one occasion,8 seems
to have played no part in the development of the rule, at least
until the time of the citation in Kenwood Tire Co. v. Speckman.
The Appellate Court in Wabash Portland Cement Co. v.
Stevens says: "No question, however, is presented as to the
admission of evidence. Grounds 9 to 20, inclusive, 22 to 32 inclusive, and 34 to 38, inclusive, in the motion for a new trial
seek to raise such questions, but the motion for a new trial does
not in many instances set out the questions and answers objected to or their substance, nor does such motion in any
instance state the grounds of objection. No determination,
therefore, can be made by this court as to the existence of harmful error on any such grounds." Of the cases cited only Coryell
v. Stone and Kenwood Tire Co. v. Speckman definitely state
that the motion for new trial must contain the grounds of objection.

It is not clear from the opinionlo that the point was

necessary to a decision, for in the instances where the grounds
of objection were not stated, it may have been that the question
or the answer was also omitted.
In Inter-Ocean Casualty Co. v. Wilkins,1 ' the Appellate Court
extends the doctrine as follows:
"Error is claimed in the admission of evidence, but the questions sought to be raised are not presented. The motion for
a new trial, in order to present any question for review, must
7 (1878) 62 Ind. 307, 311.
s Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Ragan, 171 Ind. 569.
9 (Oct. 16, 1931) 93 Ind. App. 209, 210.
10 93 Ind. App. 210.
11 182 N. E. 252, 256.
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set out, at least, the substance of the question asked, the objection made and the answer given, in order that it may be determined as to whether harmful error exists without searching
the record. In the instant case the motion fails to do this, but in
each reason set forth in said motion it is merely stated that 'the
court erred in permitting a named witness for the plaintiff to
testify, over the objection of the defendant, to certain facts.'
Neither the question nor its substance, the objection made nor
the grounds for such objection, appear. The admission of certain exhibits in evidence is also questioned, but the motion does
not disclose what any exhibit read in evidence purported to be,
nor upon what grounds of objection made it should have been
excluded."
The Greer, Kenwood and Eva cases are cited as authority and
the principle is now asserted not merely as a dictum but evidently as the basis for a decision.
Again the Appellate Court in Gaines v. Taylor,12 states the
rule as follows: "Appellants did not state in their motion for
new trial the objections made to the admission of the drawing
in evidence, at the time it was offered in evidence, nor the substance thereof, nor did they state the ruling of the court on
said objections, nor did they show the exception takenp All the
foregoing must be stated in a motion for new trial based on the
admission in evidence of an exhibit.
"The reason for this rule is to give the trial court a further
opportunity to consider and correct its rulings, without reviewing and searching the record for all matters which had a bearing
thereon."13
It appears, however, that this reason was assigned in the
Kenwood case for the necessity of setting out in the motion for
new trial the answers to the questions objected to, not the
grounds of the objections.
So well settled is the proposition by this time that the Appellate Court in Emrich Furniture Co. v. Valinetz"4 deems it unnecessary to cite reason or authority for the statement: "The
fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth attempt to raise questions of
the admission and the rejection of certain testimony, but they
present no question as neither the objections nor any offers to
prove are set out in the motion."
12

(April 21, 1933) 185 N. E. 297, 299.

13 Citing Kenwood Tire Co. v. Speckman, supra.

The same reason was
also assigned in Wabash Portland Cement Co. v. Stevens.
14 (May 18, 1933) 185 N. E. 654, 655.
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And on the same day the same court in J. K. Vaughn Bldg. Co.
v. State15 cites all the recent cases except Wabash Portland
Cement Co. v. Stevens in an opinion wherein it is stated that
the whole case turns upon the admission of two exhibits and
that these questions are not presented because in its motion for
a new trial appellant did not set out the objections, nor their
substance, to the admission in evidence of these exhibits.
So much for the history of this new rule. Apparently, it is
now the law. Is it fair? Is it necessary? To what situation will
the rule be extended? A motion for a new trial serves two ends.
It first presents to the trial court the sufficiency of his own
rulings. Secondarily it points out alleged errors for review by
the appellate court.
Filed within 30 days after the verdict or decision, when the
trial is fresh in the mind of the trial court, supported usually by
oral argument and citation of authority, the motion does not
need to be voluminous in order to present to the trial judge the
exact issue which was raised at the trial and which in the stress
thereof may not have had adequate consideration and proper
decision. When the question and the answer (or the offer to
prove) are shown by the motion, the trial court can determine,
without statement of the grounds of objection, whether or not
his decision at the trial was right or wrong. If he is thus satisfied that objectionable evidence has been introduced to the
prejudice of the losing party, in the interest of justice it is then
the trial judge's duty to grant a new trial.
In an appellate court, however, the presumption is that the
trial judge did his duty and that there has been a fair trial.
If the reason assigned for admitting or excluding evidence was
wrong but the decision was right, there is no reversible error.
If an inadequate reason was assigned by the objector and the
trial court overruled the objection, even though his decision
should have been different had an adequate reason been assigned,
there still is no reversible error. Why this is so is not here
material. It is sufficient to say that the appellate court is liot
required to remedy the trial court's error in admission or exclusion of evidence in the absence of a proper objection made
at the time the error was committed.
This error must be brought to the attention of the appellate
court. How? First, of course, every detail must appear in the
record; the question, the objection in full, the ruling, the exception, the answer. But this is not enough, for the appellate court
15 185 N. E. 656.
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has not the time to search the record, nor has it any personal
recollection such as that possessed by the judge who presided at
the trial. Obviously, therefore, the brief of appellant must point
out the error. Such is the rule adopted by the Supreme Court.
Since the brief must state so much of the record as presents
the question, why should the motion for a new trial duplicate
that statement of the record? Ought not it be sufficient to show
that the alleged error, now presented by recital of the record,
was also called to the attention of the trial judge in such a way
that it could not be overlooked by him, that is, by giving the substance of the question and answer in the motion for a new trial?
If to this is added, as must be under Rule 22, the necessity of
applying the points and authorities to the error relied upon for
reversal, the appellate court can not help knowing the precise
issue for decision on its merits.
Assuming that it is now settled that the motion for new trial
must contain the grounds of objection to the admission or exclusion of evidence, the next step may be to apply the same rule
to the instructions of which complaint is made. May we rely
upon our former practice or must we quote in the motion for a
new trial each instruction claimed to be erroneously given or
refused? And,-one step farther-must we assign in the motion
the grounds of objection to the giving or refusal?
Here we have a different situation from that presented with
reference to the admission of evidence. During the trial, no
reasons are required to be asserted for the giving or refusal of
an instruction. If the court guesses right, there is no error regardless of the reason which guided his decision. If he guesses
wrong, his error is reversible, unless it was harmless.
Since no grounds of objection to giving or refusal are required
at the time of the trial court's ruling, obviously no grounds of
objection then made can be set out in the motion for a new
trial. Then why not set out in the motion the reasons appearing
to the moving party at the time the motion is filed? This would
be of material aid to the trial court in reviewing his action. But
it never has been required.
If the logic of the above quotation from Gaines v. Taylor be
followed, anything in the record that "has a bearing" upon the
alleged error in the trial ought to be set out in the motion for a
new trial. For instance, if excessive damages are assigned as
error the motion for new trial should show why the damages
are excessive and such showing would require a recital of all the
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evidence "bearing" on the question. It is submitted that historically and logically the function of a motion for a new trial is
to point out the error, not to serve as brief or record.
The writer has no cases pending in either court wherein this
question is involved but can well believe that there are numerous
cases on the dockets of the Supreme and Appellate Courts, wherein error is assigned in the admission or exclusion of evidence and
where the motion for new trial, following the form given in
Watson's Works or similar form, was filed before the dictum in
Kenwood Tire Co. v. Speckman, May 1, 1931, and certainly
before the decision in 5. K. Vaughn Bldg. v. State, May 18, 1933.
As to these pending cases, what will be the attitude of the courts?
If the rule announced in the last case is the law, then, like any
principle of common law, it has been the law through the years,
although only recently stated. It is not announced as a new rule
adopted by the Supreme Court by virtue of an inherent power to
prescribe rules of procedure. Attorneys certainly are bound,
if any one is bound, to know the law. If they failed to set out the
grounds of objection in their motion for a new trial, then the
question is waived and the appellate court itself can so find, even
though appellee has not raised the question.
Is this fair? The Indiana State Bar Association is committed
to a bill giving the Supreme Court the right to prescribe rules
of practice and procedure, not only in that court but for all
courts of the state. But a cardinal feature of such bill is the
due and proper promulgation of changes before they become
effective. Statutory rules of procedure are not retroactive. Nor
should be rules adopted by the court. If the two appellate
courts are satisfied with the decision in J. K. Vaughn Bldg. Co. v.
State and the dicta in the preceding cases, that the motion for a
new trial must contain the grounds of objection in order to
present the question of the admissibility of evidence, it is submitted that such rule should not be enforced in any case wherein
the motion for new trial was filed prior to June 1, 1933, when
first through the Northeastern advance sheets the lawyers of
the state generally were advised of such decision.
The writer believes that rules of procedure should be prescribed by the Supreme Court, but not inadvertently, as this
one seems to have developed. Such development may be ascribed
to the pressure under which both courts are now laboring with
their congested dockets and affords argument for constructive
effort and perhaps legislation to enable the courts to get up to

156
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date that they may have adequate time for consideration not
only of their decisions, but also of the dicta in their opinions.
This is not the first dictum that has grown into law, nor will it
be the last. Some dicta deserve to survive as bases for decisions.
This one, it is submitted, does not bear analysis and ought not
be extended.

